U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said the United States and European Union must work in lockstep to “collapse Russian economy,” asserting on September 7, 2025, that only a joint surge of sanctions and secondary tariffs can force Vladimir Putin to negotiate. He described an urgent timeline, with EU sanctions officials scheduled in Washington on September 8, and framed the strategy as a test of whether Western economic power can outpace battlefield attrition in Ukraine.

Key Takeaways

– shows Bessent said on September 7, 2025, a US‑EU escalation of sanctions and secondary tariffs could trigger a “full collapse” and force negotiations. – reveals urgent Washington meetings on September 8 to coordinate with EU officials on intensified measures targeting countries buying Russian oil within 24 hours. – demonstrates Russia’s central bank expects near‑zero growth by late 2025, heightening vulnerability to synchronized US‑EU pressure as output flattens toward 0 expansion. – indicates Bessent frames a 2025 race between Ukraine’s military endurance and Russia’s economic resilience, urging faster sanctions to outpace battlefield attrition and budget adaptation. – suggests secondary tariffs broaden enforcement to third‑country oil buyers, expanding reach beyond primary sanctions and raising compliance costs across multiple trade corridors in 2025.

Why a US–EU partnership is central to collapse Russian economy strategy

Bessent’s central claim is that only a tightly coordinated transatlantic front can close the gaps that have allowed Russian revenues and imports to adapt. He singled out secondary tariffs on countries buying Russian oil as the next step, paired with tougher financial and trade restrictions, arguing that those combined levers—applied simultaneously by Washington and Brussels—could force concessions by making the Kremlin’s fiscal position untenable. Reuters reported that Bessent warned coordinated measures could cause a “full collapse” of Russia’s economy and bring Putin to the negotiating table, underscoring the need for EU‑US unity on sanctions design and enforcement [1].

In practical terms, “partnership” means sequencing actions, synchronizing targets, and ensuring that shipping, banking, insurance, and customs screens apply at the same time. It also means raising the costs for third‑country intermediaries through penalties or tariffs if they facilitate flows that undermine sanctions. The objective: compress Russia’s financing options faster than it can rewire supply chains.

Broadcast context: from studio warning to a 24‑hour policy clock

The immediate trigger was Bessent’s interview on NBC’s Meet the Press on September 7, 2025. He said the United States is prepared to increase pressure via new sanctions and secondary tariffs, while stressing that only a joint US‑EU push can collapse Russia’s economy and compel negotiations. The on‑air message was both declarative and time‑bound, signaling policy movement within days rather than weeks [2].

This framing matters for markets and governments alike. By narrowing the window to hours and days—rather than months—Bessent sought to build momentum before political resistance or commercial workarounds solidify. The subtext: closing enforcement gaps requires setting and hitting a short timeline to deny counterparties the luxury of waiting out unilateral moves.

Timetable and tools to collapse Russian economy: sanctions and secondary tariffs

Bessent’s near‑term calendar is explicit. He cited planned meetings in Washington on September 8 with EU sanctions officials to coordinate measures that reach beyond traditional primary sanctions. The additional tool on the table—secondary tariffs—targets countries that purchase Russian oil, raising costs on third‑country buyers and complicating resale and transport structures that have supported Moscow’s wartime revenues. Ukrinform reported that he linked these steps to precipitating a “total collapse,” while affirming the need for European cooperation to scale the impact swiftly [3].

Secondary tariffs, distinct from outright bans, operate through price signals rather than prohibitions alone. They can be calibrated—applied across specific commodities, routes, or flagged entities—and adjusted quickly if evasion spikes. Combined with tighter supervision of shipping, insurance, and payments channels, they aim to produce a cumulative effect: higher transaction costs, shrinking margins for intermediaries, and a narrower pool of counterparties willing to accept legal and reputational risk.

Implementation would likely proceed in waves. First, designate covered goods and jurisdictions linked to Russian energy exports. Second, define tariff rates and compliance thresholds, with automatic escalators if trade patterns do not adjust within preset intervals. Third, expand due‑diligence obligations and reporting, backed by penalties. Each step is designed to compress revenue and strain logistics simultaneously, with the US and EU moving in lockstep to prevent a “leakage” shift from one jurisdiction to another.

What near‑zero growth by late 2025 means for efforts to collapse Russian economy

Russia’s growth outlook intersects directly with sanctions efficacy. A central bank forecast of near‑zero growth by late 2025 implies a narrowing buffer for public finances, as weak output constrains tax receipts while war‑related spending remains elevated. The Kyiv Independent reported the near‑zero projection and linked it to Bessent’s call for synchronized sanctions and secondary tariffs on oil buyers, arguing that intensified measures could hasten stagnation and push Moscow toward diplomacy [4].

In macro terms, a flatlining economy reduces the space to absorb shocks. If export revenue faces tariff‑driven discounts and logistics frictions, and if import substitution fails to offset technology shortfalls, then the ability to defend the currency, service obligations, and fund the war simultaneously becomes harder. The threshold for policy strain drops as growth approaches zero; coordinated sanctions aim to push conditions past that threshold sooner.

The policy race Bessent describes—and what it means for Ukraine and Europe

Bessent cast the moment as a race between Ukraine’s military endurance and Russia’s economic resilience, placing a 2025 clock on both. The Week summarized his warning and noted an EU delegation is scheduled to meet U.S. Treasury officials to discuss new sanctions—steps that, if synchronized, could shift the balance by tightening financing windows before battlefield dynamics erode Ukraine’s leverage [5].

For Europe, the calculus includes energy security, inflation management, and political cohesion. A rapid, clearly communicated sanctions‑tariff package can reduce market volatility by clarifying the path, even as it raises enforcement burdens. For Ukraine, the hope is that a faster economic squeeze yields negotiations before fatigue sets in—trading time on the front for pressure off it.

Enforcement pathways and expected market reactions in Q4 2025

Enforcement is where strategy meets outcomes. Secondary tariffs likely route through customs and import regimes, with clear HS codes for covered goods. Expect tighter scrutiny on ship‑to‑ship transfers, changes in flag registries, and insurance coverage linked to compliance statements. Financial channels will face enhanced due‑diligence demands, especially for letters of credit and commodity trade finance tied to Russian origin goods.

Markets typically price surprise and sequence. If Washington and Brussels announce a synchronized schedule with immediate effect dates and phased escalators, shipping rates for targeted routes may jump, discounts on covered cargoes may widen, and some intermediaries could exit trades. The core objective is not to eliminate volumes overnight but to degrade value and reliability enough to starve budgetary resilience over the next several quarters.

Indicators to track: revenue, output, and trade signals

Several metrics will indicate whether the strategy is biting. On the revenue side, watch monthly energy export receipts and budget balances for signs of stress. On the real‑economy side, look at industrial output in energy‑adjacent sectors, import volumes for high‑value capital goods, and inventories, which can signal substitution limits. Trade‑finance indicators—like bank exposures to commodity deals and changes in payment terms—offer a window into compliance risk pricing.

Currency and inflation dynamics will also matter. If sanctions and tariffs tighten cash flows, defending the exchange rate at prior levels becomes costlier, potentially pressuring reserves or requiring policy trade‑offs. Inflation pass‑through from logistics frictions can erode living standards and complicate domestic stabilization. The cumulative picture—flat output, strained revenues, and costlier finance—tells you whether collapsing economic momentum is translating into political leverage.

Scenarios: forced talks versus prolonged stalemate

Two broad scenarios emerge. In the “forced talks” path, a joint US‑EU package triggers a rapid widening of discounts and trade frictions, accelerating the move from near‑zero growth toward contraction. Kremlin fiscal buffers compress, and negotiators test off‑ramps as the costs of continuing outstrip perceived benefits. Timing would hinge on how quickly enforcement closes loopholes and how comprehensive the secondary tariff coverage becomes.

In a “stalemate,” workarounds—new intermediaries, shadow fleets, bilateral side deals—dilute the impact. Growth remains near zero, but budgetary patchwork and selective import channels keep the system functioning. To avoid this outcome, policymakers would need escalation clauses tied to measurable targets—if trade flows don’t adjust by a given date, tariff rates increase or coverage expands. Precision calibration and fast feedback loops are critical.

What secondary tariffs mean for third‑country oil buyers

Secondary tariffs shift the incentive structure for third‑country purchasers of Russian oil. Buyers weighing a tariff‑inflated landed cost, heightened audit risk, and potential banking frictions may reduce volumes, demand deeper discounts, or pivot suppliers. Even if some cargoes still move, margin compression and compliance complexity accumulate, eroding the net fiscal benefit to Moscow.

The extraterritorial reach of tariffs is narrower than sanctions designations but broader than a unilateral embargo. That geometry allows for incremental pressure without immediately forcing global supply shocks. The policy bet is that incremental, synchronized steps—tariffs, tighter marine insurance scrutiny, more aggressive end‑user checks—compound into a de facto blockade of value, if not volume.

What success would look like—and the risks of overshoot

Success is measurable: a sustained drop in Russia’s budget revenues, widening trade frictions that are not offset by new channels, and macro indicators shifting from stagnation toward contraction within quarters. Diplomatically, success would pair with a credible talks track that links sanctions relief to verifiable steps—otherwise, economic pain may not translate into political concessions.

Overshoot carries risks. If tariffs and sanctions spark wider energy or shipping shocks, European inflation could re‑accelerate, testing political patience. A poorly sequenced rollout could also push trade into opaque channels faster than oversight mechanisms can follow. The solution is clear signaling, phased thresholds, and joint enforcement cells that adapt in days, not months. The same urgency Bessent voiced on September 7 and operationalized for September 8 will need to persist to avoid leakage and ensure pressure cumulates rather than dissipates.

Sources:

[1] Reuters – Economic pressure could bring Russia to negotiating table, Bessent says: www.reuters.com/world/economic-pressure-could-bring-russia-negotiating-table-bessent-says-2025-09-07/” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.reuters.com/world/economic-pressure-could-bring-russia-negotiating-table-bessent-says-2025-09-07/

[2] NBC News – Meet the Press: www.nbc.com/meet-the-press” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.nbc.com/meet-the-press [3] Ukrinform – U.S. Treasury Secretary: Russia’s economic collapse could bring Putin to negotiating table: https://www.ukrinform.net/rubric-polytics/4033980-us-treasury-secretary-russias-economic-collapse-could-bring-putin-to-negotiating-table.html

[4] Kyiv Independent – Russian economy faces near-zero growth by end of 2025 as war-driven momentum fades, central bank warns: https://kyivindependent.com/russian-economy-faces-stagnation-as-war-driven-growth-fades// [5] The Week – US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent pushes for more sanctions on Russia, its oil buyers to halt Ukraine conflict: www.theweek.in/news/world/2025/09/07/us-treasury-secretary-scott-bessent-pushes-for-more-sanctions-on-russia-its-oil-buyers-to-halt-ukraine-conflict.html” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.theweek.in/news/world/2025/09/07/us-treasury-secretary-scott-bessent-pushes-for-more-sanctions-on-russia-its-oil-buyers-to-halt-ukraine-conflict.html

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