As Washington battles over NASA’s 2026 budget, a pragmatic compromise is emerging: protect near-term Artemis missions by scrapping or deferring the SLS upper stage. The move would blunt ballooning costs while preserving core SLS flights, Orion production, and the program’s industrial base. It also offers a political off-ramp for the White House and Congress to reconcile diverging positions on whether to end or extend SLS, while buying time to assess commercial heavy-lift readiness without fully abandoning America’s government-owned deep space launcher.

Key Takeaways

– Shows FY2026 planners cited roughly $4 billion per launch and 140% cost growth to justify ending SLS after Artemis III, spurring a narrower compromise. – Reveals Congress countered with about $10 billion for NASA and a $4.1 billion line to protect SLS and Artemis IV–V in mid-2025 negotiations. – Demonstrates industrial exposure: roughly $82 billion tied to Boeing and subcontractors, and $22 billion in SpaceX federal contracts affected by shifting strategies. – Indicates timeline pressures: a 2027 lunar target coexists with warnings of slips to 2028–2029 if funding or hardware scope is disrupted again. – Suggests axing the SLS upper stage preserves 8.8 million pounds of thrust Block 1 missions while trimming development tasks lawmakers flagged as costly.

Why targeting the SLS upper stage could bridge the divide

The SLS program has become a flashpoint in the 2026 budget fight, with the administration proposing to halt SLS and Orion after Artemis III. The cost case is explicit: about $4 billion per launch and a 140% program cost growth, paired with private-sector upheaval that could disrupt $22 billion of SpaceX contracts if programs are restructured amid political headwinds [1].

Congressional appropriators, however, have sent clear signals that they are not prepared to abandon the Artemis architecture. That has shifted attention to discrete parts of SLS that drive complexity and cost—particularly the planned upper stage upgrade. Trimming that upgrade can protect near-term missions and jobs while addressing the headline budget numbers that triggered the proposed termination.

There is also a strategic rationale. NASA leaders need redundancy and program stability in a moment when commercial space is politically fraught. The Post reported the termination proposal while warning that politicizing key commercial providers injects dependency risk; NASA’s press office has emphasized continued work with industry partners even as the budget debate intensifies [2].

Budget math: what cutting the SLS upper stage would save

Budgeteers often look first to future upgrades when curbing growth: shifting a capability to “deferred” status can halt a costly development path without immediately grounding the core vehicle. In SLS terms, retiring or deferring the SLS upper stage would pare back integration and development spending, narrow hardware scope for the next flights, and concentrate resources on flying Block 1 missions reliably and on schedule.

While NASA has not published a revised upper-stage line-item for 2026, appropriations language indicates where negotiators may land: fund the launcher enough to support the next two Artemis missions, hold the line on major new developments, and reassess in the out-years. The effect would be to protect existing workforce and production lines while materially lowering near-term cash burn versus a full-up upgrade path.

A narrower SLS—focused on Block 1—also makes the broader Artemis ledger more predictable. It simplifies near-term test, integration, and certification plans. And it provides Congress with a tangible concession on cost and scope that short-circuits the binary “keep or cancel” impasse the 2026 proposal created.

Risks of dropping the SLS upper stage for Artemis timelines

There are trade-offs. Without the SLS upper stage, Artemis missions must be planned around Block 1 performance, potentially requiring more on-orbit assembly or partnership with commercial heavy-lift for cargo and logistics. That introduces interface risk and a tighter choreography between government and commercial vehicles as NASA aims to sustain a 2027 lunar return schedule [4].

Program managers warn that any new redesign injects schedule pressure. Congressional coverage has already flagged concerns that Artemis timelines could slide to 2028–2029 without steady funding and a tightly scoped hardware set, even as SLS provides 8.8 million pounds of liftoff thrust for Block 1 missions today [5]. The key is sequencing: stabilize what must fly next, then decide whether and when to reintroduce an upper-stage upgrade.

Political calculus and the industrial base

The politics point strongly toward a middle path. Analysts estimate roughly $82 billion in potential exposure for Boeing and its network of subcontractors if SLS were to end abruptly, and some see continued SLS operations as “more likely” given pressure to protect jobs across multiple states and sustain national prestige [3]. A compromise that narrows scope but preserves launches aligns with that calculus.

At the same time, the administration’s friction with leading commercial providers complicates an all-in commercial pivot. With about $22 billion in SpaceX contracts flagged as vulnerable amid the political feud, a policy that retains SLS while reducing its cost vector hedges against disruption and ensures multiple paths for lunar logistics and crew transport were a single provider to stumble or become entangled in politics.

This is why the SLS upper stage stands out as the pressure valve. It offers the White House a credible cost-control narrative and gives Congress a way to honor its job-protection and leadership commitments—without committing to a blank check for every planned upgrade.

What Congress has signaled so far in 2025

By July 2025, Senate appropriators joined the House to reject across-the-board NASA cuts, steering a reconciled package that restored SLS and Orion funding and added approximately $10 billion for NASA to keep the Artemis program on track for a 2027 lunar return [4].

A companion measure highlighted a $4.1 billion allocation specifically for SLS to preserve Artemis IV and V and maintain the workforce and infrastructure, while noting the rocket’s 8.8 million pounds of liftoff thrust and the risk that schedules could slip into 2028–2029 if funding or scope shifted yet again [5]. Those signals map neatly onto a compromise that focuses on flying what’s already built.

How an SLS upper stage cut would be structured

A practical compromise would likely take the form of a deferral rather than an outright cancellation. Congress could direct NASA to prioritize Block 1 missions through Artemis V, pause or cancel the SLS upper stage line pending a programmatic review, and deliver an updated plan aligning mission design with available propulsion.

In parallel, lawmakers could task NASA with an options analysis that compares three pathways: continuing SLS without the upper stage, reintroducing an upper stage later if budgets improve, or relying more heavily on commercial heavy-lift for cargo elements while retaining SLS for crewed flights. This would formalize a split mission architecture that is already materializing as commercial vehicles scale up.

The agency could be asked to rebaseline milestones, risk, and cost for each option, including the logistics implications for Gateway assembly, cargo manifests, and on-orbit aggregation. The target outcome: a stable, sequenced plan that de-risks near-term missions and narrows future upgrade commitments to those with clear cost-benefit payoff.

What cutting the SLS upper stage means for Artemis missions

For Artemis IV and V, the immediate effect would be tighter mission designs around Block 1 capability. That means more emphasis on efficient payload packaging, potential staging concepts using commercial tugs or tankers, and a premium on schedule reliability over maximum lift capacity.

For Orion, keeping SLS in a Block 1 configuration may reduce integration churn, which is crucial when teams are preparing successive flights. Incrementalism often beats scope expansion when schedules are tight and budgets are contested. If the upper stage is deferred, every freed dollar can be funneled into flight readiness, ground operations, and risk reduction.

For lunar infrastructure, a deferral would likely nudge more cargo to commercial super heavy-lift once it is operational and certified for NASA missions. That preserves the spirit of a mixed-fleet Artemis architecture: a government launcher for crew and critical paths, with private cargo options driving down cost per kilogram over time.

Contractor and workforce implications

Boeing would avoid the shock of a wholesale cancellation but face a narrower work package. Subcontractors clustered around propulsion, avionics, and structures would see steadier demand for Block 1 hardware, test, and refurbishment—while any upper-stage-specific work would slow or stop. That is far easier to manage than a cliff-edge shutdown and aligns with the notion that much of the sector’s value is in retaining a skilled workforce for when budgets turn.

Commercial providers, meanwhile, stand to gain if cargo flow migrates further toward private lift. But they also face a cautionary tale: politics can move quickly. A diversified plan—SLS for crew, commercial for cargo—reduces the odds that a single political rupture jeopardizes the entire lunar pipeline. For mission planners, diversity equals resilience.

Risks of dropping the SLS upper stage for Artemis timelines

There will be capability debates. Some lunar surface logistics are easier with a heavier SLS configuration. Pausing the upper stage rebalances who does what: SLS covers human-rating and proven crew lift; commercial players shoulder more bulk cargo. That places a premium on interface standards, propellant transfer readiness, and certification timelines for private vehicles.

The second risk is optical. Critics may label the move as capitulation or accuse NASA of abandoning heavy-lift ambitions. The counterargument is simple: fly now, upgrade later—once cost curves and commercial performance justify it. A clear, data-driven rebaseline and transparent milestones can neutralize most optics risk.

What to watch next

– Appropriations report language: Does Congress direct a deferral of the SLS upper stage and request a rebaseline, or leave scope unspecified? – NASA’s FY2026 operating plan: Which lines get protected or trimmed, and how are Artemis IV–V milestones sequenced? – Commercial readiness: What integration, refueling, and certification milestones do private heavy-lift providers hit before mid-2026? – Industrial base posture: Do contractors announce workforce stabilizations tied to Block 1, or signal layoffs linked to upper-stage uncertainty? – Artemis schedule markers: Are 2027 objectives reaffirmed with clear risk reserves, or do managers prepare contingency paths into 2028–2029?

The political logic is lining up. The White House wants to demonstrate cost control. Congress wants to safeguard jobs, leadership, and near-term lunar milestones. Cutting the SLS upper stage threads the needle: it lowers the program’s risk profile and burn rate while preserving the rockets, spacecraft, and missions Americans will see launch next.

Sources:

[1] Reuters – Musk-Trump breakup puts $22 billion of SpaceX contracts at risk, jolting US space program: www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-will-decommission-dragon-spacecraft-musk-says-feud-with-trump-escalates-2025-06-05/” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-will-decommission-dragon-spacecraft-musk-says-feud-with-trump-escalates-2025-06-05/

[2] The Washington Post – Musk-Trump rupture poses a serious threat to NASA and Pentagon programs: www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/06/05/musk-trump-dragon-space-station/” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2025/06/05/musk-trump-dragon-space-station/ [3] Forbes – Trump-Musk Blowup Could Be Good News For Boeing: www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2025/06/05/trump-musk-blowup-could-be-good-news-for-boeing/” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremybogaisky/2025/06/05/trump-musk-blowup-could-be-good-news-for-boeing/

[4] SpacePolicyOnline – Senate Appropriators Join House in Opposing Trump’s NASA Cuts: https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/senate-appropriators-join-house-in-opposing-trumps-nasa-cuts/ [5] The Spokesman-Review – Trump’s big bill has billions added for Artemis, KSC and moving a space shuttle: www.spokesman.com/stories/2025/jul/05/trumps-big-bill-has-billions-added-for-artemis-ksc/” target=”_blank” rel=”nofollow noopener noreferrer”>https://www.spokesman.com/stories/2025/jul/05/trumps-big-bill-has-billions-added-for-artemis-ksc/

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